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OPINION  
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Ginnine Fried bought a home in 2007 for $553,330. It 
was near high tide in the real estate market, but she had to 
believe she was getting a bargain, as an appraisal estimated 
the home’s value to be $570,000. Fried borrowed $497,950 at 
a fixed interest rate to make her purchase and mortgaged the 
home as collateral. Because the loan-to-purchase-price ratio 
($497,950 / $553,330) was more than 80%, JPMorgan Chase 
Bank, N.A. (“Chase”), the servicer for Fried’s mortgage (that 
is, the entity who performs the day-to-day tasks for the loan, 
including collecting payments), required her to obtain private 
mortgage insurance. Fried had to pay monthly premiums for 
that insurance until the ratio reached 78%; in other words, the 
principal of the mortgage loan needed to reduce to $431,597, 
which was projected to happen just before March 2016. 
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 We now know that the housing market crashed in 
2008, and the value of homes dropped dramatically. Fried, 
like many homeowners, had trouble making mortgage 
payments. Help came when Chase modified Fried’s mortgage 
under a federal aid program by reducing the principal balance 
to $463,737. The rub was that Chase extended Fried’s 
mortgage insurance premiums an extra decade to 2026. 
Whether it could do this depends on how we interpret the 
Homeowners Protection Act (“Protection Act”), 12 U.S.C. 
§ 4901 et seq. Does it permit a servicer to rely on an updated 
property value, estimated by a broker, to recalculate the 
length of a homeowner’s mortgage insurance obligation 
following a modification or must the ending of that obligation 
remain tied to the initial purchase price of the home? We 
conclude the Protection Act requires the latter. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 Mortgage insurance protects the owner or guarantor of 
mortgage debt—typically the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (“Fannie Mae”) or Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (“Freddie Mac”)—from a borrower’s risk of 
default. Traditional underwriting standards require 
homebuyers to pay at least 20% of a home’s purchase price in 
cash—that is, they require the homebuyer to obtain 20% 
equity in the home at the time of purchase and finance 80% of 
the home’s purchase price. If homebuyers cannot pay at least 
20%, then they must purchase mortgage insurance. Once the 
balance due on a home loan falls below 80% of the home’s 
purchase price, mortgage insurance is no longer necessary 
because “excessive [mortgage insurance] coverage does not 
benefit the homeowner . . . and provides little extra protection 
to a lender.” S. Rep. No. 105-129, at 3 (1997). 
 Before Congress took action by passing the Protection 
Act in 1997, many lenders would continue to collect 
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mortgage insurance payments after a homeowner had gone 
below the 80% loan-to-value mark. H.R. Rep. No. 105-55, at 
6 (1997). In the Act Congress set national standards for 
mortgage insurance termination. It requires mortgage 
servicers to (1) provide periodic notices to a 
borrower/mortgagor1 regarding mortgage insurance 
obligations, (2) automatically terminate mortgage insurance 
on a statutorily defined schedule, and (3) grant a borrower’s 
request to cancel her mortgage insurance once certain 
conditions are met. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4901-03. 
 Under the Protection Act, mortgage servicers must 
automatically terminate mortgage insurance for a fixed-rate 
loan like Fried’s on “the date on which the principal balance 
of the mortgage . . . is first scheduled to reach 78 percent of 
the original value of the property securing the loan.” 12 
U.S.C. § 4901(18)(A). The “original value” of a home is “the 
lesser of the sales price of the property securing the mortgage, 
as reflected in the contract, or the appraised value at the time 
at which the subject residential mortgage transaction was 
consummated.” 12 U.S.C. § 4901(12). As noted, the purchase 
price of Fried’s home was less than its appraised value, so her 
home’s “original value” is $553,330. Seventy-eight percent of 
that figure—the key value for mortgage insurance 
termination—is $431,597.40. Under her loan’s amortization 
schedule, Fried’s unpaid principal balance was set to reach 
$431,597.40 just before March 1, 2016, and therefore her 
mortgage insurance obligation would terminate on that date. 
                                              
1 The Protection Act defines “mortgagor” as the 
“original borrower under a residential mortgage or his or her 
successors or assignees.” 12 U.S.C. 4901(11). We therefore 
use “borrower,” “mortgagor,” and “homeowner” 
interchangeably throughout this opinion. 
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 When Fried ran into financial trouble following the 
financial crisis of 2008, she and Chase agreed on January 10, 
2011, to modify her mortgage under the Home Affordable 
Mortgage Program (“HAMP”). The HAMP was enacted as 
part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 in 
response to the financial and housing crisis of that time. See 
Spaulding v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 714 F.3d 769, 772 (4th 
Cir. 2013). Under the HAMP, participating mortgage 
“servicers agreed to identify homeowners who were in default 
or would likely soon be in default on their mortgage 
payments, and to modify the loans of those eligible under the 
program. In exchange, servicers would receive a $1,000 
payment for each permanent modification, along with other 
incentives.” Id. at 773 (quoting Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 556 (7th Cir. 2012)). Per the modification 
agreement she reached with Chase, the principal balance of 
Fried’s loan was reduced to $463,736.98. 
 The Protection Act provides for the treatment of 
mortgage modifications in 12 U.S.C. § 4902(d): 
If a mortgagor and mortgagee (or holder of the 
mortgage) agree to a modification of the terms 
or conditions of a loan pursuant to a residential 
mortgage transaction, the cancellation date, 
termination date, or final termination shall be 
recalculated to reflect the modified terms and 
conditions of such loan. 
Accordingly, Chase was required to update Fried’s 
termination date to reflect the “modified terms and 
conditions” to which the parties “agree[d.]” Pursuant to the 
loan’s modified amortization schedule (modified, that is, to 
account for the reduced principal), Fried’s outstanding 
principal balance would reach 78% of her home’s original 
value ($431,597) in July 2014. Compl. ¶¶ 47, 50. 
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 After receiving the modification, Fried asked Chase 
when she would be relieved of her obligation to make 
monthly mortgage insurance payments. On August 31, 2012, 
Chase responded that her mortgage insurance obligation 
would automatically terminate on November 1, 2026. This 
date was ten years later than her mortgage insurance 
termination date before the modification and twelve years 
later than the recalculated date based on her decreased 
principal balance. Her monthly mortgage insurance premium 
is approximately $252.83, so a ten-year extension of those 
premiums would cost her an additional $30,339.60. See 
Compl. ¶ 6. 
 With this in mind, Fried wrote Chase to question the 
new termination date and ask how the bank reached its 
conclusion. It responded on October 10, 2012, and April 9, 
2013, stating that November 1, 2026, is “when the loan will 
reach 78% based on the modified terms and conditions.” 
Compl. ¶ 53. Seventy-eight percent of what exactly Chase did 
not say, so Fried wrote again. 
 Chase’s response on October 4, 2013, clarified how it 
arrived at the 2026 termination date. In order to participate in 
the HAMP program, it was required to obtain a Broker’s 
Price Opinion (“BPO”) estimating the value of Fried’s home 
at the time of the modification. A BPO is a much less 
rigorous estimate of a property’s market value than is an 
appraisal. See In re Thomas, 344 B.R. 386, 393 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 2006) (“Full appraisals, not just the ‘drive by’ Broker’s 
Price Opinion, are used . . . when the matter is contested.”); 
see also In re Kasbee, 466 B.R. 719, 723 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
2010) (bank “realized that the comparables utilized in the 
BPO were inadequate and that as a result it was obtaining a 
full appraisal to determine the true value”). 
8 
 
 In any event, Chase explained that it had substituted its 
BPO of $420,000 for the home’s $553,330 original value. 
Because the BPO was much smaller, Fried would not pay 
down her outstanding principal balance to 78% of the BPO 
(78% x $420,000 = $327,600) until November 1, 2026. 
 It is worth pausing for a moment to understand the 
math behind Chase’s purported extension of Fried’s mortgage 
insurance obligation. Remember that the mortgage insurance 
obligation ends when Fried has paid down the principal 
balance owed on her mortgage to 78% of her home’s original 
value. That is, she must pay down her mortgage balance to 
78% of $ 553,330, which is $431,597. 
 In this way, the Protection Act’s mortgage insurance 
termination date sets a finish line that homeowners go toward 
by paying down their mortgage debts. Fried started with a 
mortgage debt of $497,950 and would reach her finish line 
once the outstanding principal debt was $431,597. Put 
differently, she would cross this threshold after making 
$66,353 of payments toward her mortgage’s principal 
balance, which, according to her initial amortization schedule, 
she would do in 2016. When her mortgage was modified, 
Fried leapt forward toward her goal: the modification 
decreased her outstanding principal balance to $463,737, so 
she would reach the $431,597 finish line sooner, in 2014, by 
making just $32,140 in principal payments. But when Chase 
substituted the BPO for the original value of Fried’s home, it 
moved the finish line. Seventy-eight percent of the $420,000 
BPO is $327,600. According to her modified amortization 
schedule, Fried would not pay down her mortgage debt to 
Chase’s new $327,600 finish line—more than $136,137 in 
mortgage principal payments away—until 2026. 
 In April 2015, Fried filed a complaint on behalf of 
herself and similarly situated individuals. She asserted that by 
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relying on the BPO to calculate her mortgage insurance 
termination date, rather than her home’s original value, Chase 
violated the Protection Act. Chase filed a motion to dismiss, 
contending that its substitution of the BPO for the original 
value did not violate the Protection Act and that Fried’s 
action was barred by the Act’s two-year statute of 
limitations.2 
 The District Court denied Chase’s motion but certified 
its appeal to our Court, recognizing that whether Chase 
violated the Protection Act is a controlling question of law 
with substantial ground for difference of opinion that is likely 
to advance this case’s resolution. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); 
Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 754 (3d Cir. 
1974) (en banc). We agreed to hear the appeal. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 Chase contends that it was entitled to recalculate 
Fried’s termination date by substituting the BPO it obtained at 
the time of the modification for her home’s original value. It 
equivocates on whether it could do this only because of 
certain HAMP rules or whether the Protection Act would 
permit the substitution more generally. In either case Chase is 
                                              
2 The complaint names both Chase and its parent 
company, JPMorgan Chase & Co. (“JPMC”), as defendants. 
While the District Court did not address the issue in its 
opinion, parent companies are not, merely by dint of 
ownership, liable for the acts of their subsidiaries. Pearson v. 
Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 484 (3d Cir. 2001). At 
oral argument, Fried’s counsel acknowledged that the 
complaint did not allege any wrongdoing by JPMC itself and 
that the claims against JPMC should be dismissed. Oral 
Argument Jan. 18, 2017, at 25:10-13. 
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wrong: the Protection Act required calculation of Fried’s 
termination date on the basis of her home’s original value, 
which under the Act is its purchase price. 
 Whether Fried knew or should have known of Chase’s 
violation of the Protection Act outside of the statute-of-
limitations period is not clear on the face of her complaint, 
and thus the District Court was correct not to dismiss on this 
ground. 
 A. The Homeowners Protection Act 
  1.  The Statute’s Text 
Under the Protection Act a homeowner’s obligation to 
pay mortgage insurance premiums ends on the “termination 
date if, on that date, the mortgagor is current on the payments 
required by the terms of the residential mortgage 
transaction[.]” 12 U.S.C. § 4902(b)(1). For a fixed-rate 
mortgage, like Fried’s, the termination date is 
the date on which the principal balance of the 
mortgage, based solely on the initial 
amortization schedule for that mortgage, and 
irrespective of the outstanding balance for that 
mortgage on that date, is first scheduled to 
reach 78 percent of the original value of the 
property securing the loan[.] 
12 U.S.C. § 4901(18)(A). Simply put, a homeowner’s 
termination date is when she will have paid down her loan’s 
principal balance to the point that it equals 78% of her home’s 
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original value.3 All agree that the original value of Fried’s 
home in 2007 was its purchase price of $553,330. 
 When Fried and Chase agreed to modify her mortgage 
in 2011, another provision of the Protection Act came into 
play. Section 4902(d) provides that “[i]f a mortgagor and 
mortgagee . . . agree to a modification of the terms or 
conditions of a loan . . . [, the] termination date . . . shall be 
recalculated to reflect the modified terms and conditions of 
such loan.” The process envisioned by § 4902(d) is that we 
ask which terms or conditions of Fried’s loan she and Chase 
agreed to modify; then we recalculate her termination date to 
reflect the modified terms and conditions. 
 Recall that to calculate initially the termination date 
for mortgage insurance payments we must determine when 
the principal balance of the mortgage is first scheduled to 
reach 78% of the original value of the property securing the 
loan. 12 U.S.C. § 4901(18). There is no question that Fried’s 
agreement with Chase modified the outstanding principal 
balance of her mortgage by reducing it to $463,737, so her 
termination date needed to be recalculated to account for that 
change. Reducing a homeowner’s principal balance moves 
her closer to the finish line established by the termination 
date—in Fried’s case, the date at which her outstanding 
principal balance would reach $431,597. According to the 
modified amortization schedule reflecting the reduced 
principal balance, the termination date, per 12 U.S.C. 
§ 4902(d), would be recalculated to occur in 2014. 
                                              
3 A homeowner’s mortgage insurance obligation will 
not end per § 4902(b)(1) on her termination date if she is not 
“current on the payments required by the terms of the 
residential mortgage transaction[,]” but that issue is not raised 
in this case. 
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 But Chase went one step further. It replaced the 
original value of Fried’s home with its BPO estimating the 
home’s value at the time of the 2011 modification. The 
BPO’s estimate was substantially less than her home’s 
original value. So the substitution had the effect of moving 
Fried’s finish line further away: she was not scheduled to pay 
down her debt to 78% of the BPO’s $420,000 value (as noted, 
$327,600) until 2026. 
 According to Fried’s complaint, her written agreement 
with Chase did not explicitly mention or change the original 
value of her home as defined by § 4901(12).4 Compl. ¶ 51. 
                                              
4 Indeed, it is not obvious that even an explicit 
agreement could depart from § 4901(12)’s definition of 
“original value.” The Protection Act sets a timeline for 
terminating mortgage insurance premiums on the basis of 
specific facts about the property and elements of the mortgage 
transaction: the purchase price or appraised value of the home 
and the loan’s amortization schedule. 12 U.S.C. § 4901(18). 
Section 4902(d) updates that timeline with respect to terms 
and conditions of the loan, like the amortization schedule, that 
have been modified. But a home’s purchase price and 
appraised value are not terms of the loan; they are facts that 
do not change with the loan’s provisions. 
 
 Moreover, permitting lenders and servicers to modify 
at will the mortgage insurance termination date set by the 
Protection Act by redefining “original value” would arguably 
undermine the Act’s purpose—to safeguard consumers from 
overpaying mortgage insurance premiums by setting a 
consistent and predictable termination date. If lenders and 
servicers could contract around the Act’s timeline by 
redefining key terms, the Act would be no more than a 
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Chase does not contend otherwise, but instead responds that 
substitution of the BPO for the home’s original value was 
permissible because it was a “term” or “condition” of Fried’s 
modification under § 4902(d) that the HAMP rules required. 
Hence we turn to those rules. 
 The Making Home Affordable Program Handbook for 
Servicers of Non-GSE Mortgages (the “HAMP Handbook”) 
states that “[s]ervicers must obtain an assessment of the 
current value of the property securing the mortgage loan 
being evaluated for HAMP.” HAMP Handbook, 6.8 Property 
Valuation, Version 3.0, 73, available at 
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_serv
icer/mhahandbook_30.pdf (December 2, 2010). It goes on to 
specify that “[s]ervicers may use either an automated 
valuation model (AVM), . . . a broker’s price opinion (BPO), 
or an appraisal” to measure the property’s value at the time of 
modification. Id. The Handbook, however, says nothing about 
using the BPO to calculate the period of a homeowner’s 
mortgage insurance obligation. HAMP rules told Chase to get 
the BPO, but they did not require Chase to substitute that 
value for the “original value” that the statute, § 4901(18), 
relies on to compute the mortgage insurance termination date. 
 Chase responds that, even if not required by the 
HAMP, use of the BPO for the termination date calculation 
was a “condition” of the modification because Chase would 
not have modified the loan without first getting an updated 
property valuation. This argument suffers from the same 
logical flaw as Chase’s argument tied more closely to the 
HAMP Handbook: even if Chase’s obtaining a BPO was a 
prerequisite to Fried’s mortgage modification, that cursory 
calculation does not replace under the Protection Act the 
                                                                                                     
contractual default rule that a few lines of boilerplate could 
override. This issue, however, we need not decide. 
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original value of Fried’s property for mortgage insurance 
purposes. 
 Should we interpret “conditions” expansively to 
include any necessary precursors to the modification of 
Fried’s loan? We think not, as § 4902(d) relies on changes to 
the terms and conditions of the loan itself. No matter what led 
to the modification, the key inquiry is which of the loan’s 
terms and conditions were modified, not any conditions 
precedent. 
 Most significantly, however, the Protection Act 
updates the termination date only with respect to the loan 
provisions that the parties “agree” to modify: “If a mortgagor 
and mortgagee . . . agree to a modification of the terms or 
conditions of a loan . . . [, the] termination date [for mortgage 
insurance payments] . . . shall be recalculated to reflect the 
modified terms and conditions of such loan.” 12 U.S.C. 
§ 4902(d). Here we come full circle to what did Fried and 
Chase actually agree. 
 The obvious objection is that if courts must look to 
each modification agreement to determine which terms and 
conditions the borrower agreed to modify in order to calculate 
the mortgage insurance obligation, the inquiry will be so 
individualized and factually intensive as to destabilize the 
mortgage market. But calculation of an updated termination 
date always requires reference to the modification agreement. 
There is no other way to know which terms and conditions of 
the loan have been modified. At the least, the updated 
principal balance and interest rate (whether fixed or variable) 
will depend on the agreement. Moreover, as Fried points out, 
inquiry into the terms of modification agreements likely will 
be a routine exercise, as servicers like Chase use an industry 
standard form for modifications. See, e.g., Rice v. Green Tree 
Servicing, LLC, No. 3:14-CV-93, 2015 WL 5443708, at *5 
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(N.D.W. Va. Sept. 15, 2015) (“Under the Servicing 
Guidelines, servicers are directed to use Form 3157, a 
standard form, during the loan modification process . . . .”). 
 Chase retorts that, regardless what its written 
agreement with Fried might say, its reliance on the BPO was 
justified because “all applicable or relevant laws must be read 
into the agreement of the parties just as if expressly provided 
by them, except where contrary intention is evident.” 
Williams v. Stone, 109 F.3d 890, 896 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Wright v. Commercial & Sav. Bank, 464 A.2d 1080, 1083 
(Md. 1983)). According to Chase, Fried impliedly agreed to 
substitute the BPO’s estimate for her home’s original value 
because the HAMP Handbook provided the background law 
for the modification agreement. 
 We disagree, for (as already discussed) nothing in the 
HAMP’s requirements (even assuming they are “applicable or 
relevant laws”) required substitution of the BPO for original 
value. And, in any event, § 4902(d) updates a homeowner’s 
termination date to reflect the terms and conditions of her 
loan she agreed to modify and does not incorporate the 
provisions of a handbook that guides her servicer. 
What is ironic is that Chase advocates a heads-I-win, 
tails-you-lose, interpretation of the HAMP. As the Seventh 
Circuit observed, when “homeowners [have] tried to assert 
rights arising under HAMP itself [against servicers,] [c]ourts 
have uniformly rejected these claims because HAMP does not 
create a private federal right of action for borrowers against 
servicers.” Wigod, 673 F.3d at 559 n.4; see also Senter v. 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1350–51 
(S.D. Fla. 2011) (“Plaintiffs’ reliance on the HAMP 
Guidelines[,] rather than a formula contained in their 
[agreements with Chase] to provide the terms of their 
permanent modifications[,] is an improper attempt to assert a 
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private right of action under the HAMP.”); Puzz v. Chase 
Home Fin., L.L.C., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1123 (D. Ariz. 
2011) (“Even assuming that HAMP guidelines encourage 
lenders to provide [certain benefits] to their debtors, there is 
no authority for the proposition that HAMP or its regulations 
or guidelines create a private right of action against lenders 
who begin foreclosure without doing so.”); Coulibaly v. J.P. 
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. CIV.A. DKC 10-3517, 2011 
WL 3476994, at *15 (D. Md. Aug. 8, 2011) (“Plaintiffs may 
not establish liability by relying on Chase’s alleged violations 
of certain servicing guidelines promulgated by the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury in connection with HAMP.”).5 
The proverb “what is good for the goose is good for the 
gander” applies: the HAMP’s provisions do not bind the 
parties to a mortgage modification only when they benefit 
Chase. 
Moreover, courts have held—at least twice at Chase’s 
behest—that the HAMP’s rules are not themselves the terms 
of modification agreements between borrowers and servicers. 
E.g., Short v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, No. CV-11-133-PHX-
DGC, 2011 WL 9160941, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2011) 
(“HAMP is not a contract between Plaintiffs and Chase, and 
did not amend Plaintiffs’ loan documents.”); Wright v. Chase 
Home Fin. LLC, No. CV-11-0095-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 
2173906, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 2, 2011) (“HAMP is not a 
contract between plaintiff and defendants, did not amend 
plaintiff’s loan contracts, and does not contain a private right 
of action.”); see also Grona v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 3-12-
0039, 2012 WL 1108117, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 2, 2012) 
                                              
5 Where courts have allowed HAMP-related actions, the 
substantive “claims [were] based on contract, tort, and/or 
state consumer fraud statutes[,]” rather than the provisions of 
the HAMP itself. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 559 n.4. 
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(“HAMP is not a contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
HAMP did not modify Plaintiff's Loan Documents, and 
HAMP does not contain a private right of action.”). 
 For these reasons, the Protection Act’s text does not 
support replacement of the $553,330 original value of Fried’s 
home with Chase’s $420,000 BPO. 
  2.  Statutory Structure and Legislative History 
 Chase looks to the Protection Act’s statutory structure 
and legislative history to counter the result we reach, but 
these guides to the Act’s intent only strengthen our 
conclusion. Congress amended in 2000 the Protection Act 
with respect to loan modifications and refinancing 
transactions. See Private Mortgage Insurance Technical 
Corrections and Clarification Act (the “Corrections Act”), 
P.L. 106-569, 114 Stat. 2944 (2000) (amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 
4901, 4902, 4903, 4905). The purpose of the Corrections Act 
was, among other things, to eliminate “uncertainty relating to 
the cancellation and termination of [mortgage insurance] for . 
. . loans whose terms or rates are modified over the life of the 
loan.” 146 Cong. Rec. H. 3578-02, H3579 (May 23, 2000). 
 
 With respect to mortgage refinance transactions, which 
are distinct from mortgage modifications, Congress amended 
the definition of “original value” such that “[i]n the case of a 
residential mortgage transaction for refinancing the principal 
residence of the mortgagor, [original value] means only the 
appraised value relied upon by the mortgagee to approve the 
refinance transaction.” 12 U.S.C. § 4901(12). Thus, when a 
homeowner refinances her home mortgage loan, the “original 
value” of her home will become the appraised value relied on 
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by the mortgagee.6 And, accordingly, her termination date 
will reflect the new “original value.” See 12 U.S.C. 
§ 4901(18). 
 
 But for mortgage modifications Congress did not make 
any such provision to update a home’s original value. Instead, 
with respect to modifications like Fried’s, Congress added the 
language discussed above that “[i]f a mortgagor and 
mortgagee . . . agree to a modification of the terms or 
conditions of a loan pursuant to a residential mortgage 
transaction, the . . . termination date . . . shall be recalculated 
to reflect the modified terms and conditions of such loan.” 
Corrections Act, PL 106–569, 114 Stat 2944 (2000); 12 
U.S.C. § 4902(d). Unlike the refinance provision, the 
language Congress chose for mortgage modifications does not 
change the “original value” of a home when the modification 
occurs. Only the “terms and conditions” of the loan modified 
by the parties’ agreement are updated, and, for the reasons 
detailed earlier, replacement of the original value with some 
other value is not necessarily one of them. 
 Chase contends that “Congress used different language 
and different statutory provisions with respect to loan 
modifications and refinanc[ings], but it provided that updated 
property valuations be used for [both modifications and 
refinancing transactions].” Chase’s Reply at 14. Of course, 
                                              
6 Notably, even for a refinance transaction the “original 
value” is not necessarily the value of the home at the time of 
refinancing. Section 4901(12) incorporates the “appraised 
value relied upon by the mortgagee to approve the refinance 
transaction.” Id. (emphasis added). If the mortgagee relied on 
the appraisal performed at the time of the home’s initial sale, 
that appraised value would remain the “original value” of the 
home even after the refinancing. 
19 
 
when Congress uses different language in the same act, we 
usually presume the opposite—that different language points 
to a different result. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
432 (1987) (“Where Congress includes particular language in 
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the 
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion” (internal brackets, quotation marks, and citation 
omitted)). 
 Here the distinction Congress drew makes sense. 
When a borrower refinances her mortgage, she pays off her 
old debt with a new loan, often from a different lender. A 
refinancing is a new “residential mortgage transaction.” 12 
U.S.C. § 4901(15) (“a transaction . . . in which a mortgage . . . 
or . . . security interest is created or retained . . . to finance the 
acquisition, initial construction, or refinancing of that 
dwelling”). The new lender thus should not be bound by the 
property valuation relied on by the initial lender. 
 A modification, on the other hand, is merely “an 
alteration or amendment” to the existing mortgage contract, 
see Modification, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), 
and is not a new “residential mortgage transaction,” see 12 
U.S.C. § 4901(15). While the Protection Act presumes that a 
lender will rely on an appraisal before completing a 
refinancing transaction, see 12 U.S.C. § 4901(18), the HAMP 
Handbook makes clear an appraisal is not a prerequisite to a 
mortgage modification. HAMP Handbook, at 73 (“Servicers 
may use either an automated valuation model (AVM), . . . a 
broker’s price opinion (BPO), or an appraisal.”). 
 Chase directs us to several passages of the 
Congressional Record to support its contention that 
§ 4902(d)—despite its text—permits substitution of an 
updated property value at the time of modification for a 
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home’s original value.7 Not one of the passages it points to 
actually says that, nor do they overcome § 4902(d)’s text, 
structure, or amendment history. 
 Congress reasonably chose to treat mortgage 
modifications and refinancing transactions differently. Its 
explicit command to update the original value of a home 
when a mortgage is refinanced is strong evidence that it 
declined to permit such an update impliedly for mortgage 
modifications. 
  3.  Fannie Mae Servicing Guidelines 
 
 Chase next argues that the Fannie Mae Servicing 
Guidelines support its position. Unlike the sources discussed 
above, they do permit what Chase did. However, we decline 
to follow the Servicing Guidelines because the Protection Act 
explicitly overrides them, and Fannie Mae’s interpretation of 
the Protection Act is not entitled to deference. 
 
 Taken together, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “own or 
guarantee close to half of the home loans in the United 
                                              
7 For example, both in its brief and at oral argument 
Chase brought our attention to a statement of the Corrections 
Act’s sponsor that the bill “clarifies that[,] in the case of . . . 
loan modifications, [loan-to-value] calculations are made 
based on the most recent amortization schedule, not based on 
an outdated schedule.” 146 Cong. Rec. H. 3578-02, H3580 
(May 23, 2000). But Fried does not dispute that an updated 
amortization schedule must be used to calculate her 
termination date. The amortization schedule was necessarily 
altered when her principal balance was decreased as agreed in 
the mortgage modification. Chase’s mistake was its reliance 
as well on an updated value for her home. 
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States.” See Town of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 699 
F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 2012). Even for mortgages not owned 
or guaranteed by them, mortgage lenders and servicers “are 
guided in their decisions by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
requirements.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As is 
typical in the secondary mortgage market, the pooling-and-
servicing agreement between Chase and the owners of Fried’s 
mortgage debt incorporates the Fannie Mae Servicing 
Guidelines.8 
 
 The Guidelines provide that servicers must calculate 
“[mortgage insurance] termination eligibility . . . [by] us[ing] 
the amortization schedule of the modified mortgage loan and 
the property value at the time of the mortgage loan 
modification.” Fannie Mae Servicing Guide, B-8.1-04: 
Termination of Conventional Mortgage Insurance, 
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/servicing/b/8.1/04.
html (Jan. 18, 2017) (emphasis added). The Guidelines add 
that servicers must “adhere to applicable state law related to 
the type of valuation to use to determine the property value at 
                                              
8 Chase does not argue that the pooling-and-servicing 
agreement or the Fannie Mae Guidelines it incorporates are 
directly binding on Fried. See e.g., Fellows v. CitiMortgage, 
Inc., 710 F. Supp. 2d 385, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Servicing 
Guidelines are not incorporated into contracts between 
borrowers and lenders). It relies on the Fannie Mae Servicing 
Guidelines only as an interpretive guide to the Protection Act. 
See Oral Argument Jan. 18, 2017, at 34:14-22 (“[W]e’re not 
contesting that the statute obviously ranks higher than . . . the 
Fannie Mae guide, but in trying to understand what 4902(d) 
means, we would look to Fannie Mae’s consistent 
interpretation since 2010[.]”). 
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the time of the mortgage loan modification[,]” but that 
generally “[a] BPO or a new appraisal may be used[.]” Id. 
 
 According to Chase, the Servicing Guidelines provide 
the definitive interpretation of the Protection Act’s 
requirements. But Congress anticipated the possibility of 
conflicts between the Act and pooling-and-servicing 
agreements that rely on the Servicing Guidelines and 
explicitly provided that the Protection Act would take 
precedence: 
 
The provisions of this chapter shall supersede 
any conflicting provision contained in any 
agreement relating to the servicing of a 
residential mortgage loan entered into by the 
Federal National Mortgage Association, the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or 
any private investor or note holder (or any 
successors thereto). 
 
12 U.S.C. § 4908(b). If the Servicing Guidelines would 
produce a result that departs from the Protection Act’s text, 
there is a conflict, and per § 4908(b) the statute prevails. 
 
 Chase contends that we should defer to Fannie Mae’s 
interpretation of the Protection Act under the doctrine of 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), which offers 
deference according to the “‘thoroughness evident in [the 
agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking 
power to control.’” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 268 
(2006) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). But Fannie 
Mae’s Guidelines are not entitled to deference. First, they 
simply do not square with the text of the Protection Act. 
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 Second, Skidmore deference is available only to 
agencies interpreting the statutes they administer. See Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. at 228. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not 
administrative agencies. They “are federally-chartered but 
privately owned corporations that issue publicly traded 
securities.” Delaware Cty., Pa. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 
747 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2014).9 
 Nor does it administer the Protection Act. When 
Congress passed the Act it did not designate a regulator to 
interpret it. 146 Cong. Rec. H. 3578-02, H3581 (May 23, 
2000) (“Unfortunately, when we passed the Homeowner’s 
Protection Act, we were unable to prevail on one issue, and 
that was to actually have a regulator to work out some of the 
details of the statute and the underlying policy.” (Rep. 
Vento)). Indeed, if deference to any entity would be 
appropriate under the Protection Act, we would owe it to the 
several financial regulatory agencies that Congress authorized 
to enforce the Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 4909(b). 
 Fourth, application of the Servicing Guidelines in this 
context would conflict with guidance issued by the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), one of the agencies 
                                              
9 When Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were in desperate 
financial distress in 2008, “Congress created [an agency 
called the Federal Housing Finance Agency] to act as 
conservator for Fannie and Freddie.” Delaware Cty., 747 F.3d 
at 219 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A 
conservatorship is like a receivership, except that a 
conservator, like a trustee in a reorganization under Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code, tries to return the bankrupt party 
to solvency, rather than liquidating it.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
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authorized to enforce the Protection Act. A CFPB 
Compliance Bulletin provides as follows: 
Many mortgage loans are owned by 
Government-Sponsored Enterprises, or GSEs, 
such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. These and 
other loan investors often create their own 
internal [mortgage insurance] cancellation 
guidelines that may include [mortgage 
insurance] cancellation provisions beyond those 
that the [Protection Act] provides. 
 
The CFPB cautions servicers to implement 
investor guidelines in a way that does not lead 
them to violate consumer financial law. Both 
the [Protection Act] and some investor 
requirements contain similar [loan-to-value] 
thresholds for [mortgage insurance] cancellation 
and termination, and use similar measures of the 
property’s value. Servicers should nonetheless 
remember that investor guidelines cannot 
restrict the [mortgage insurance] cancellation 
and termination rights that the [Protection Act] 
provides to borrowers. 
 
CFPB Bulletin 2015-03, Compliance Bulletin: Private 
Mortgage Insurance Cancellation and Termination, at 5, 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201508_cfpb_compliance-
bulletin-private-mortgage-insurance-cancellation-and-
termination.pdf (Aug. 4, 2015) (emphasis in original). Chase 
relied on the Servicing Guidelines to extend Fried’s mortgage 
insurance obligation and thereby limited her termination 
rights, things (as the Bulletin advises) they cannot do. 
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 Finally, as noted above, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
own or guarantee nearly half the home mortgage loans in 
America. Mortgage insurance covers against loss to a loan’s 
owner or guarantor from a borrower’s default, and Fannie 
Mae is the beneficiary of mortgage insurance. See 12 
U.S.C. § 1717(b)(2) (Fannie Mae charter provision requiring 
mortgage insurance when the outstanding principal balance of 
the mortgage at the time of purchase exceeds 80% of the 
value of the property securing the mortgage). Consequently, 
when it sets mortgage-insurance-related guidelines, Fannie 
Mae is not acting as an administrative agency neutrally 
interpreting laws for the marketplace; it is a market 
participant interpreting laws for the benefit of its shareholders 
and is not entitled to deference. 
 For these reasons, the Fannie Mae Servicing 
Guidelines are not persuasive and do not alter our conclusion 
that, taking the facts alleged in Fried’s complaint as true, 
Chase violated the Protection Act. 
  4.  Purpose and Consequences 
 Hoping to avoid the result dictated by the Protection 
Act’s text, Chase contends that the statute’s purpose and the 
consequences of the District Court’s interpretation support 
reversal. We disagree. 
 Chase notes that the purpose of the Protection Act is to 
protect consumers from continuing to pay mortgage insurance 
premiums after they have accrued 20% equity in their homes, 
at which point mortgage insurance is no longer necessary. 
Our interpretation of the Protection Act is at odds with this 
purpose, Chase contends, because Fried (whose home’s value 
dropped) may stop paying mortgage insurance premiums 
before she reaches 20% equity, while other consumers (whose 
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home values have risen) may continue paying after obtaining 
20% equity. 
 When Congress enacted the Protection Act, however, 
it chose to prioritize predictability of consumers’ mortgage 
insurance obligations over economic precision. The Act sets a 
homeowner’s mortgage insurance termination date as the day 
her outstanding principal balance “is first scheduled to reach 
78 percent of the original value of the property securing the 
loan[.]” 12 U.S.C. § 4901(18). Because housing values can 
fluctuate with national economic trends (as Fried’s example 
demonstrates), the Protection Act’s timeline does no more 
than approximate the economic need for mortgage insurance 
in any particular case. This sacrifice of precision for 
predictability allows the Act to provide both consumers and 
lenders with certainty as to their respective mortgage 
insurance obligations from the moment the original value is 
known and the amortization schedule is set. 
 Chase contends that, while Fried is harmed by the 
replacement of her home’s original value with an updated 
value, most consumers would benefit from such a 
substitution. Its rationale is that, because most home values 
rise over time, we can safely assume that most borrowers 
seeking mortgage modifications will see the value of their 
homes increase between purchase and modification, and thus 
substitution of new for old home values will lead to shorter 
mortgage insurance obligations for most borrowers. 
 Based on recent history, the links in Chase’s logical 
chain are weak. It is far from obvious that most homeowners 
seeking mortgage modifications would have seen their 
individual homes follow this upward trend. Indeed, if most 
homeowners receiving modifications bought during the recent 
housing bubble and modified after the burst, substitution of 
updated housing values for original values would 
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substantially increase their premium burdens if mortgage 
insurance termination dates change as Chase claims. It is 
exactly this narrative that Fried’s case represents. 
 When it passed the Protection Act, Congress made a 
tradeoff between precision and predictability that we are not 
free to rebalance. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s 
holding that Fried has adequately stated a claim that Chase 
violated the Act. 
 B. Statute of Limitations 
 This case is before us because the District Court 
certified interlocutory review of the controlling question of 
law discussed above. However, “once leave to appeal is 
granted the court of appeals is not restricted to a decision of 
the question of law which in the district judge’s view was 
controlling.” Katz, 496 F.2d at 754. Thus our Court may 
consider the other ground for dismissal Chase asserted in the 
District Court. 
 The Protection Act’s statute of limitations provides 
that “[n]o action may be brought by a mortgagor . . . later 
than 2 years after the date of the discovery of the violation 
that is the subject of the action.” 12 U.S.C. § 4907(b). Chase 
contends that Fried discovered its alleged violation of the 
Protection Act more than two years before she filed her 
complaint and that it therefore must be dismissed. 
 “Technically, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
require a defendant to plead an affirmative defense, like a 
statute of limitations defense, in the answer, not in a motion 
to dismiss.” Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 
2014). “In this circuit, however, we permit a limitations 
defense to be raised by a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) only if 
the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the 
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cause of action has not been brought within the statute of 
limitations.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). “Since the applicability of the statute of limitations 
usually involves questions of fact for the jury,” Van Buskirk 
v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481, 498 (3d Cir. 1985), 
“if the bar is not apparent on the face of the complaint, then it 
may not afford the basis for a dismissal of the complaint 
under Rule 12(b)(6)[,]” Schmidt, 770 F.3d at 249 (internal 
quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).  
 Chase argues that the statute of limitations began to 
run in August 2012 when Fried received its letter with the 
2026 mortgage insurance termination date. But, after 
receiving that letter, Fried wrote back to ask how Chase 
arrived at the new date. It responded in October 2012 that 
“November 1, 2026 . . . is the date when the loan will reach 
78% based on the modified terms and conditions.” Compl. ¶ 
53. Even then, the denominator of the fraction (78% of 
what?) remained a mystery. It was only in October 2013, 
following additional inquiries, that Chase specified that it 
used the BPO estimate of $420,000 obtained at the time of the 
mortgage modification to calculate Fried’s termination date. 
Fried filed her complaint less than two years later in April 
2015. 
 Whether Fried knew or should have known of “the 
violation that is the subject of [her] action[,]” 12 U.S.C. 
§ 4907(b), when she received notice of the new termination 
date or notice of the basis of its calculation is a factual 
question. She asserts that she did not know, and could not 
have known, of the violation until she knew why Chase had 
said that her mortgage insurance obligation would 
automatically terminate in 2026. Indeed, the argument 
continues, until she knew the basis of Chase’s move-back of 
the mortgage insurance finish line, she could not have known 
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whether it was Chase’s conduct (or some other entity’s) that 
may have violated the Act. 
 Moreover, when she received Chase’s letters, Fried 
had not yet suffered the sort of injury that ordinarily would 
put one on notice of a legal violation. Her initial mortgage 
insurance obligation ran through March 1, 2016 (and her 
correctly modified termination date would have fallen in July 
2014). Thus, when Fried received Chase’s letters in 2012 and 
2013, she was still paying mortgage insurance premiums as 
expected and had not yet been required to pay premiums she 
did not owe. 
 Fried’s plausible contentions are enough to defeat 
Chase’s motion to dismiss. Which of Chase’s letters would 
have led Fried to discover her action is a factual question, and 
the answer to it is not clear from the face of the complaint. 
See Schmidt, 770 F.3d at 249.  It is ripe for our remand. 
* * * * * 
 The Protection Act sets the finish line (i.e., the 
termination date) for each homeowner’s mortgage insurance 
obligation on the basis of her home’s original value and 
measures her progress toward it by looking to her outstanding 
principal balance. Fried’s mortgage modification decreased 
her principal balance, but her home’s original value under the 
Act did not change. The modification thus moved her toward 
the finish line per § 4902(d) of the Act, but, although her 
home had dropped in value, it did not move the line itself. 
Fried’s termination date is the day her mortgage’s outstanding 
principal balance was scheduled to reach $431,597. If she was 
current on her mortgage payments at that date, her mortgage 
insurance obligation ended then. 
30 
 
 In this context, we affirm the District Court’s 
determination declining to dismiss Fried’s claim against 
Chase and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
